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ESTATE TAX VALUATION OF A CLOSELY-HELD 
BUSINESS 
By 
Martin H. Zern * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For federal estate tax purposes, asset valuation is a recurring 
issue that frequently results in litigation. Often, a dispute arises 
in determining the fair market value of a closely-held business 
interest as of the date of death of a stockholder. For a publicly 
traded corporation, valuation is fairly straightforward; the value 
of listed stock can readily be ascertained by reference to daily 
stock market reports. More specifically, Treasury regulations 
provide that "ifthere is a market for stocks or bonds, on a stock 
exchange, in an over-the-counter market, or otherwise, the 
mean between the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on 
the valuation date is the fair market value per share or bond."1 
The value of real estate is more problematic due to its 
unique character. Good practice would seem to dictate that an 
appraisal be obtained from a qualified real estate appraiser. If 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not accept the 
appraisal, it should at least be a starting point for negotiating a 
settlement. If the controversy winds up in court, the testimony 
of the appraiser would be relevant, along with the testimony of 
the appraiser chosen by the IRS, in assisting the judge or jury 
*Professor, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 
Pleasantville, New York 
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in determining the value. It may be noted that there is a section 
in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) containing special, and 
quite technical, rules for the valuation of farms and real estate 
that are part of a closely-held business and that are significant 
part of an estate? 
Apart from the special valuation procedure just mentioned, 
which has its own complexities and uncertainties, the valuation 
of a closely-held business presents even more thorny issues 
than valuing real estate. For a closely-held corporation, 
technically one is valuing the stock. However, assuming that 
there are no bid-and-asked prices, the value of the stock must 
be determined by an analysis of the underlying business. 
Treasury regulations attempt to give some guidance in this area 
mentioning some of the factors that should be considered.3 
The basic factors mentioned in the regulations are the 
company's net worth, prospective earnings power, capability to 
pay dividends and other relevant factors. In this regard, "other 
relevant factors" set forth are: goodwill, economic outlook for 
the industry, position in the industry, management, degree of 
control represented by the block of stock being valued, and the 
value of stock in similar businesses for which market 
quotations are available. The regulations state the weight to be 
given to any one factor depends on the facts of each case. At 
perhaps a third level, the regulations state that consideration 
should be given to non-operating assets, such as, life insurance 
proceeds paid to the corporation, if not already considered. 
Complete financial information is required to be submitted 
with the estate tax return, including reports of accountants, 
engineers, or any other timely reports of experts. 
The IRS provided further guidance regarding factors to be 
considered in valuing a closely-held business in a Revenue 
Ruling issued back in 1959.4 In addition to the factors set forth 
in the regulations and the ruling, however, the courts over the 
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years have taken into account numerous other factors that were 
considered relevant.5 These factors are described hereafter. 
Because there is so much ambiguity in valuing a closely-
held business, a stockholder whose estate may be subject to 
federal, and possibly state, estate taxes obviously has an 
interest in minimizing the value and avoiding a potential and 
costly battle with the IRS, which may have an uncertain 
outcome. Additionally, the stockholders in a closely-held 
corporation often want control to remain with the surviving 
stockholders. A commonly employed way to set value and 
assure that control remains with the survivors is by an 
agreement among the stockholders providing for a fair payment 
to the deceased stockholder's estate in exchange for a transfer 
of the stock of the stockholder to the surviving stockholder(s) 
or to the corporation. Life insurance on the stockholders is 
often carried in order to provide the funds necessary to achieve 
a buyout of the interest of the deceased stockholder. The 
beneficiary of the policy can be the corporation, which will 
then have funds to effect a redemption from the estate of the 
deceased stockholder, or each stockholder can take out a policy 
on the life of the other stockholder(s) in order to effect a 
purchase directly by the surviving stockholder(s) of the stock 
of the deceased stockholder(s). 
A key provision in any buyout agreement is the method or 
methods laid out for valuing the interest of a deceased 
stockholder. Usually, a method is described for valuing the 
corporation as a whole. The value of a deceased's 
stockholder' s interest is then calculated by simply multiplying 
his or her percentage interest in the corporation times the value 
established for the entire corporation. Some common methods 
utilized to set the value of the corporation upon a stockholder's 
death are: by reference to an annual written agreement of the 
stockholders establishing the value; by referring the matter to 
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the firm's current accountant; and by referring the matter to a 
panel of arbitrators. However, the agreement may set the value 
of the corporation at book value, which may not reflect its 
actual value. Further, a stockholder' s agreement may set the 
value of the deceased stockholder's interest at the amount of 
life insurance carried on the stockholder. These are by no 
means all the methods of valuation, the stockholders being free 
to adopt any method of valuation they can conjure up. What 
has been of particular concern to the IRS over the years, 
however, were stockholder buyout agreements that set the 
value of a stockholder's interest at less than its actual fair 
market value. 
IRC §2703. It is important to recognize that the basic rule 
for determining the value of an asset to be included in the gross 
estate of a decedent is the fair market value at date of death. 6 
As noted, the IRS has issued regulations elaborating on this 
rule in the case of a closely-held business. Over the years, 
however, courts refined the regulatory guidance to provide an 
exception in the case of property subject to a valid buyout 
agreement, provided certain requirements were met.7 In 1990, 
Congress enacted IRC §2703 in order to codify and limit the 
requirements articulated by the courts. This section states that, 
unless certain exceptions are applicable, as detailed in the next 
paragraph, the value of any property is to be determined 
without reference to any right to acquire property or the right to 
sell or use it. The section was enacted as part of overall 
legislation to overcome devices utilized to "freeze" the value of 
an asset.8 
More specifically, in order for a prov1s1on in a buyout 
agreement setting value to be effective, the agreement must: 
(1) be a bona fide business arrangement, (2) not be a device to 
transfer assets to family members for inadequate consideration, 
and (3) have terms comparable to similar arrangements 
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negotiated at ann's length. Each of these requirements must be 
individually met. Further details are provided in Treasury 
regulations.9 The section is applicable to all agreements created 
or substantially modified after October 8, 1990. 10 The 
applicability of §2703 to a specific fact pattern is illustrated by 
a recent decision. 
II. ESTATE OF GEORGE BLOUNT 
In Blount, 11 a 2005 decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the Court considered whether §2703 permitting the 
value of an interest in a closely-held corporation to be 
determined by the agreed upon price in a stock buyout 
agreement was applicable, and whether life insurance proceeds 
paid to the corporation and used to redeem the stock of a 
deceased stockholder should be considered an asset of the 
corporation in determining its value. The Eleventh Circuit 
agreed with the Tax Court decision concerning the buyout 
agreement, holding it was inapplicable in determining the value 
of the corporation. With respect to the life insurance proceeds, 
which the Tax Court found should be included in valuing the 
corporation, the Circuit Court disagreed and reversed. 
A. Facts 
Blount Construction Company (BCC) is a closely-held 
construction company. It had two stockholders, William C. 
Blount (Blount) and James M. Jennings (Jennings), who had 
entered into a stock purchase agreement in 1981 under which 
stockholder consent was necessary to transfer the stock and the 
stock of a deceased stockholder had to be redeemed by BBC. 
The redemption price was set at an amount to be agreed upon 
or, lacking an agreement, at a price based on book value. In the 
early 1990s, BCC purchased insurance policies on the 
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stockholders in the amount of $3 million each m order to 
provide funds for a stock redemption. 
In 1992, BCC instituted an employee stock ownership plan 
(ESOP). A third party completed annual valuations of BCC to 
facilitate the ESOP. In early 1995, for example, BCC was 
valued at about $7.9 million. 
Early in 1996, Jennings died owning 46% of BCC, which 
received about $3 million from insurance proceeds and paid a 
little less to Jennings' estate to redeem his stock. BCC 
determined the amount to be paid to the estate based upon the 
book value of BCC for the previous year. 
In October 1996, Blount was diagnosed with cancer and 
given only a few months to live. Concerned that a buyout of 
his shares would deprive BCC of liquidity, he ordered studies 
to determine how much his estate could receive for his shares 
and still leave BCC in healthy financial condition. Apparently, 
Blount was not concerned about his family since they were 
independently wealthy. 
In November 1996, Blount amended the buyout agreement 
binding BCC to purchase his interest from his estate locking 
the price at $4 million. A recent appraisal, however, valued 
BCC at $8 million suggesting that his interest was worth about 
$6.7 million based upon his then approximate 83% interest in 
BCC, which was his interest when he died in September 1997. 
On Blount's estate tax return, the value ofBCC was declared at 
$4 million, the price fixed under the buyout agreement. The 
IRS assessed a deficiency claiming that BCC was worth in 
excess of $9.5 million and that Blount's interest was worth a 
little over $7.9 million. 
The Tax Court concluded that the 1981 buyout agreement, 
as amended in 1996, should be disregarded. Further, it held 
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that the insurance proceeds received by BCC upon Blount's 
death should be included for purposes of determining the value 
of the corporation. At the trial, two experts testified for the 
estate. One expert used a cash flow approach resulting in a 
value of $4.5 million for BCC and $3.8 million for Blount's 
interest. The Tax Court completely rejected this valuation on 
the basis that it ignored non-operating assets, which the 
regulations require to be considered. The other expert offered 
by the taxpayer, using a blend of asset and income approaches, 
valued BCC at $6 million. The IRS expert, using essentially 
the same method, came up with a value for BCC of $7 million. 
He then added the insurance proceeds for a combined value of 
$10 million for the corporation. The estate's expert, however, 
did not add the insurance proceeds. Taking into account an 
adjustment for the ESOP, the Tax Court came up with a 
valuation for BCC in the amount of $6.75 million before taking 
into account the insurance paid to BCC in the amount of $3.1 
million. Accordingly, it held that the value of the corporation 
was $9.85 million and that Blount's 83% interest was worth 
$8.2 million. On this basis, it held that there was a tax 
deficiency of $1.36 million. 
B. Court Opinion 
The Eleventh Circuit initially noted that it reviews factual 
determinations of the Tax Court only if clearly erroneous. 12 In 
this regard, it noted that it did not fmd clear error in the lower 
courts determination of a value of $6.75 million. However, the 
Court disagreed with the Tax Court's holding that the $3.1 
million insurance proceeds should be included in determining 
the value of BCC. 
Initially, the Court noted that prior to the enactment of 
§2703, the courts had carved out an exception to a fair market 
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value evaluation for property subject to a valid buyout 
agreement. The court exception, it observed, has three 
requirements: (1) the offering price must be fixed; (2) the 
agreement must be binding both before and after the death of 
the deceased stockholder; and (3) there must be a genuine 
business reason for the agreement that does not act as a 
substitute for a testamentary disposition. 13 This court 
articulated doctrine was codified by IRC § 2307, as previously 
mentioned. The court doctrine and § 2307 are similar except 
that the code section requires the buyout agreement to be 
similar to one negotiated at arm's length. 
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed each of the estate 's 
arguments on appeal. First, it considered whether the 
agreement as modified created a value binding on the IRS. 
Next, it considered the Tax Court's computation of the value of 
the BCC shares held by Blount at the time of his death. 
The Circuit Court agreed with the Tax Court that the 
original agreement was substantially modified in 1996 thereby 
making it subject to IRC §2703. It agreed that the modification 
was substantial from several perspectives. Pursuant to the 
1996 amendment, Blount's interest was frozen at $4 million. 
Based upon his 83% interest, the value of BCC 
was therefore set at $4.8 million. A 1997 appraisal, however, 
gave a book value of $8.5 million, which would have been the 
value under the original agreement without the modification. 
Accordingly, there were substantially different valuation 
methods before and after the modification. There were other 
modifications that the Court also agreed were substantial, for 
example, the ability of BCC to effect the redemption in 
installments was eliminated. 
1. No Binding Agreement: 
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Finding §2703 applicable, the Court then considered the 
requirement under Treasury regulations that little weight will 
be given to an agreement under which the decedent is free to 
dispose of securities at any price he chooses during his 
lifetime.14 Such an agreement is inconsistent with a bona fide 
business arrangement. 15 After the death of Jennings, Blount 
owned 83% of BCC and was its president and sole director. 
Accordingly, the buyout agreement could be changed at any 
time since the only parties necessary to change it were Blount 
and BCC, an entity he controlled. The Court found that the 
ESOP's approval was not necessary to change the agreement 
disagreeing with the estate's argument to that effect. Thus, it 
was held that Blount could unilaterally change the agreement 
during his lifetime, and in fact did modify it. The failure to 
meet this regulatory requirement meant that the exception to 
valuing the stock interest at less than fair market value was 
inapplicable. 
2. Comparability: 
Although perhaps not necessary, since it had decided that 
the agreement was not binding during Blount's lifetime, the 
Circuit Court also reviewed whether the agreement met the test 
under §2703 that the agreement be comparable to similar 
arrangements. The Tax Court had concluded that it did not. 
Under Treasury regulations, similar arrangements are those that 
"could have been obtained in fair bargain among unrelated 
parties in the same business dealing with each other at arm's 
length," where a bargain is one that "conforms with the general 
practice of unrelated parties under negotiated agreements in the 
same business."16 Referring in some detail to the testimony of 
the experts who testified in the Tax Court, the Circuit Court 
disagreed with the conclusion of the Tax Court that the 
agreement did not meet the comparability test was clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, it let stand the Tax Court's 
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determination that the agreement failed the comparability 
requirement. 
3. Fair Market Value: 
As noted, the Tax Court had determined that the fair market 
value of BCC was $9.85 million including $3.1 million 
proceeds from life insurance payable to the corporation on 
Blount's death. The Circuit Court, however, held that the Tax 
Court erred when it included the life insurance proceeds. 
Accordingly, it held that the value of BCC on Blount's death 
was $6.75 million excluding the life insurance proceeds. 
Although Treasury regulations require that non-operating 
assets be considered in valuing a corporation, as earlier 
mentioned, the Circuit Court concluded that this regulation did 
not require the inclusion of the life insurance proceeds. 
4. The Life Insurance Proceeds: 
Although only a brief segment of the opinion, arguably the 
most important aspect of Blount was the Circuit Court's 
reversal of that part ofthe Tax Court's opinion dealing with the 
$3.1 million of life insurance proceeds that were paid to BCC 
on Blount's death. The IRS position was that the life insurance 
proceeds should be included in determining the value of BCC. 
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held that the life 
insurance proceeds increased the value of the corporation form 
$6.75 million to $9.85 million. 
The underpinning of the Tax Court's holding is a provision 
in the regulations providing that in valuing corporate stock, 
consideration should be given to non-operating assets 
including, life insurance proceeds payable to the corporation. 17 
However, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that this provision is 
followed by a limiting phrase: "to the extent that such non-
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operating assets have not been taken into account .... " In this 
regard, the Circuit Court concluded that the life insurance 
proceeds had been taken into account since there was an 
offsetting, dollar-for-dollar, contractual obligation18 on the part 
of the corporation to pay the proceeds to Blount' s estate in a 
19 stock buyout. 
5. Corporate Owned Life Insurance: 
The gross estate of a decedent for estate tax purposes 
includes the proceeds of life insurance on the life of the 
decedent if the decedent possessed at death any of the incidents 
of ownership with respect to the policy.20 Treasury regulations 
particularize what is meant by "incidents of ownership."21 
this regard, the regulations provide that incidents of ownership 
held by a corporation (i.e. , a corporate-owned policy) will not 
be attributed to a sole or controlling stockholder (one with 
more than 50% of the voting power) to the extent that the 
proceeds of the policy are payable to the corporation or on 
behalf of the corporation (such as to liquidate a corporate 
debt.)22 
The regulations note, however, that the proceeds of the 
policy should be considered in determining the value of the 
decedent's stock.23 Further, it is provided that if any part of the 
proceeds are not payable to the corporation and are not taken 
into account in valuing the corporate stock, any incidents of 
ownership held by the corporation as to that part of the 
proceeds will be attributable to the decedent based on stock 
ownership. For example, if a decedent is the controlling 
stockholder, and if a corporate-owned policy is paid to the 
decedent's spouse, the proceeds of the policy will be included 
in the decedent's gross estate. As a further example, if the 
proceeds are paid 60% to the corporation and 40% to the 
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decedent's only the 40% is includable in the decedent's 
gross estate. 
The IRS and the Tax Court apparently concluded that under 
the regulations the proceeds of the policy should be considered 
in determining the value of the gross estate. The Eleventh 
Circuit did not disagree that the policy should be considered in 
determining the value of the corporate stock. As noted, 
however, it concluded that there was an equal and offsetting 
liability on the part of the corporation to redeem Blount's 
stock, thus netting out to zero the receipt by BCC of the life 
insurance proceeds. 
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the 
buyout agreement was invalid for purposes of determining the 
value of BCC and that fair market value was the proper basis 
for determining the value. Furthermore, the Circuit Court held 
that the Tax Court erred in ignoring the 1996 amended 
agreement at least to the extent it that it created a contractual 
obligation to redeem Blount's stock with the insurance 
proceeds. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Since buyout agreements are commonplace in closely-held 
corporations, the Blount decision is important for delineating 
the factors that must be present in order for a redemption price 
set in a buyout agreement to supercede a fair market value 
evaluation. It is the author's opinion that §2703 sets the bar 
quite high in order to meet the requirements of the section. It 
would seem that if a value set in a buyout agreement is too far 
removed from a strict fair market value determination, it 
probably would not meet the requirements of §2703.25 If 
§2703 is found to be inapplicable, then the value of the 
corporation in a court proceeding will be determined by the 
2007 I Estate Tax Valuation I 26 
judge's evaluation of the testimony of the experts. In this 
regard, it is not necessarily a case of "splitting the baby in 
half." It is noteworthy that the Tax Court judge completely 
disregarded the testimony of one of the experts provided by the 
estate. Consequently, attorneys retaining an expert must do 
their due diligence to assure that the expert is knowledgeable 
about evaluation methods and about what methods are 
acceptable by a court. 
Finally, Blount is important for clarifying how life insurance 
proceeds, which are payable to a corporation and which are 
required to be used to fund a buyout commitment, are to be 
treated. It is hoped that the IRS will accept the result in Blount 
and not litigate this issue further in view of the fact that both 
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits disagree with its position. 
Insofar as the Tax Court is concerned, it is required to follow 
the "rule of the circuit."26 Consequently, it could continue to 
side with the IRS in other circuits. With two circuits against it, 
however, there is a good chance that it will rule in the 
taxpayer's favor regardless of the circuit in which the litigation 
arose, assuming the IRS persists in litigating this issue. 
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With the entrance of woman into the workplace and the 
current American trend to spend more time at work, office 
dating is on the rise. Vault's 2005 Office Romance Survey 
revealed that fifty-eight percent of employees have been 
involved in an office romance, up from forty-six percent in 
2003.1 Another survey found that ninety-two percent of over 
31 ,000 men and women questioned admitted to finding a 
coworker attractive and flirting with him or her? 
While the office may be evolving into the hottest 
singles scene, these statistics give employers plenty of reasons 
to fear potential lawsuits. Completely prohibiting dating 
among co-workers has proven impractical and difficult to 
enforce. One major concern is a sexual harassment claim 
following a bad breakup between two employees. Legal 
Assistant, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, NYC 
In light of the inevitability of romance in the workplace, many 
employers are experimenting with "love contracts" to protect 
themselves from potential sexual harassment claims. 
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies 
Ithaca College School of Business 
*B.S. Cornell University, 2005 
